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Abstract
This paper explores the relation between board-level financial expertise, the profitability and
the  risk  profile  with  panel  data  from  the  UK  banking  industry.  The  empirical  findings
document that collectively, financial experts have a positive influence on the performance
outcomes of banks, they contribute to higher risks, especially in the case of large banks, while
they improve the stock performance of the associated banks. Moreover, the results highlight
that  board-level  qualified accountants have no statistical  effect  on that  profitability, while
such a positive link is established for the case of financial and banking professors, as well as
for financial  experts  from other  industries.  Such findings imply that  these two groups of
professional  financial  experts  may  be  easier  adopted  at  group-level  profits  enhancement.
Robustness checks confirm the results for all types of banking institutions, except those with a
strong real-estate activity portfolio. Finally, certain commercial and/or policy implications of
the results are reported.
JEL Classification: G20; G21; G24; G32; C33
I. Introduction
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the board of directors has a great responsibility for
the effective allocation and use of corporate resources, while financial reporting and
monitoring require a certain level of financial expertise across directors, given that a
key function of corporate governance is to ensure that firms avoid bankruptcy (Darrat
et al., 2015). Moreover, board-member financial acumen is also important in highly
financial  regulated  sectors,  such  as  the  banking  sectors  (Kim et  al.,  2014),  while
sound accounting helps to promote stewardship, as well as the supply of decision-
making information to internal and external users. As a result, accounting and finance
expertise  on  the  board  are  expected  to  be  substantially  linked  to  high-quality
reporting, as well as enhanced investor confidence (Defond et al., 2005; kim et al.,
2014). Harris and Ravin (2008) also show that financial experts in banking boards
imply lower costs  in acquiring information about the complexity and certain risks
linked  to  a  number  of  financial  transactions,  thus  mitigating  any inefficiencies  in
monitoring senior management. 
There  is  a  specific  strand  in  the  literature  of  corporate  governance  that
explicitly examines the role of personal idiosyncratic characteristics in relevance to
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the  managerial  experience  and  technical  knowledge  of  board  directors  and  the
association  of  those  characteristics  with firms’  performance  (Masulis  et  al.,  2012;
Kim et al., 2014), while others document that there is weak evidence that the financial
expertise of board directors impacts in a statistically significant manner on corporate
results (Defond et al., 2005; Hoitash et al., 2009). Our study is close to the literature
that explores how certain governance mechanisms, such as the board structure, affect
the performance of  banking institutions.  Raheja  (2005) notes  that  in  complex and
risky  firms,  such  as  banks,  board-level  financial  experts  lead  to  the  reduction  of
verification costs in relevance to financial information, which promotes the efficiency
and reliability of the external audit function. Overall, based on the mechanism of the
agency theory, the presence of such persons as directors serves the interests of capital
providers. The presence of accountants as financial experts on boards also emphasizes
the  role  of  reporting  of  financial  information  as  the  primary  interest  to  creditors,
shareholders and potential investors (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In other words, it
is the realization of accounting earnings, proxied by the net profit margin, the return
on  assets  and  the  return  on  equity  that  matters  when  professionally  qualified
accountants predominate on the board. 
By contrast, others have documented the absence of any statistical association
between the board structure and the performance of banking firms. Booth et al. (2002)
provide  evidence  on  the  role  of  internal  monitoring  mechanisms,  e.g.  outside
directors,  for  the  banking  industry.  They  document  that  the  presence  of  such
mechanisms is not very strong, comparatively in other sectors, such as the industrial
sector.  Moreover,  others  assert  that  the  proportion  of  directors  maintaining  an
employment relationship  with the bank (i.e.,  inside directors),  as well  as all  other
directors (i.e., outside directors) does not have any statistically significant impact on
bank performance (Griffith et al., 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2008). Staikouras et al.
(2007) reach the same conclusion after examining the effect of the executive and non-
executive directors’ ratio upon bank performance. 
This  study  is  also  close  to  the  strand  of  the  literature  on  the  relationship
between board members characteristics and the financial  effectiveness of corporate
governance. The novelties of such an approach are manifold. First, evidence on the
link  between  board-level  financial  expertise  matters  in  terms  of  banks’  financial
performance seems to be important in terms of shaping future governance guidelines
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and practices, while no relevant study, to the best of our knowledge, appears in the
literature. Second, the selection of banks of different size and governance structures
enables research to benefit from increased within sample variation, while it mitigates
potential  selection  bias  in  relevance  to  studies  that  use  data  drawn from publicly
traded banks. Third, the appointment of financially equipped directors into boards can
be important for the viability of non-bank financial institutions that are also involved
in risky lending business and developing new risky financial  products.  Hence,  the
underlying  empirical  findings  could  be  of  equal  importance  for  firms beyond the
banking industry, such as those in the insurance industry. Fourth, the use of panel
methodology will significantly assist to alleviate endogeneity concerns resulting from
unobserved bank-level heterogeneity.
At the same time, a number of European countries have enacted regulations
since  the  2007-09  financial  crisis  that  requires  senior  managers  and  directors  to
demonstrate they have requisite expertise in financial matters. More specifically, the
Basel Committee’s October 2010 Principles for enhancing corporate governance, in
collaboration  with  country  regulatory  authorities  represented  a  consistent
development in certain efforts to promote sound corporate governance practices for
banks.  One of  those  practices  was  closely  associated  with  substantial  progress  in
employing  collective  board  skills  and  qualifications.  The Committee  revisited  the
2010 guidance in 2015 by providing stricter rules with respect to the qualifications a
certain number of board of directors should hold. In that sense, the board must be
suitable  to  carry  out  its  responsibilities  and  have  a  composition  that  facilitates
effective oversight. For that purpose, the board should be comprised of a sufficient
number of independent directors with specialized skills and expertise commensurate
with the size, complexity and the risk profile of the bank. Therefore, relevant areas of
competence may include capital markets, financial analysis, financial stability issues,
financial  reporting,  information  technology,  strategic  planning,  risk  management,
compensation,  regulation,  corporate  governance  and  management  skills  (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015).
Based on the  above discussion  and facts,  this  study continues  this  line  of
research and investigates how the financial expertise in the boards of directors affects
bank performance (profitability) in a sample of U.K. banks. It provides supportive
evidence on the necessity to have financial experts on the board of directors in the
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banking sector, a sector that significantly determines the course of the real economy,
especially after the 2008 financial crisis experience. It further continues the paper by
Minton et  al.  (2014) who examine how financial  expertise  among board directors
affects the stock performance in a sample of U.S. banks. Their findings highlight the
presence of a positive link between financial expertise and risk taking only prior to the
financial crisis, as well as with a lower stock performance, only in the financial crisis
period.  Our  study  uses  longitudinal  data,  spanning  the  period  2001  to  2016  on
banking institutions data drawn from the UK’ banking industry to provide, for the first
time, empirical evidence on the effect of financial expertise on banks’ profitability.
An  additional  novelty  of  the  paper  is  that  it  explicitly  considers  three  specific
categories of financial expertise, i.e. financial and banking professors, professionally
qualified accountants, and financial and experts from other industries, on a number of
measures of banking industry profitability, i.e. return on assets, return on equity, and
net profit margin. Finally, the analysis documents that the baseline results seem to
hold for the majority  of banks under study, except  those with a strong real estate
portfolio of activities.
II. Methodology
The  econometric  model  that  examines  the  empirical  link  between  board-level
financial experts and the performance of the US banking institutions is that of the
GMM methodological approach. The model is described as follows:
PERit = ai + bi + c1 FINEXPit + d’ X’it + vit
where i denotes the ith banking institution and t time. a i and bi denote bank and time
fixed  effects,  respectively,  while  PER is  one  of  the  three  dependent  profitability
variables,  i.e.  interest  margin  (INTMAR),  return  on  assets  (ROA) and returns  on
equity (ROE). X’it denotes a vector of a number of control variables explained shortly.
Finally, vit denotes the error component of the model.
The  model  considers  a  number  of  control  variables  that  determine  the
performance of a banking institution.  More specifically,  such controls  involve the
banking  industry’s  concentration  (HERF),  and  operating  expenses  management
(OEM). The first determinant  is the Herfindahl index (HERF), which captures the
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market power for individual banks. The index is defined as the squares of individual
bank asset shares in the total banking sector assets for an individual bank. The market
power evidence  argues  that  a  higher  (lower)  level  of  concentration  leads  to  more
(less)  monopolistic-type  of  profits,  although  higher  (lower)  concentration  in  the
banking sector is associated with less efficient capital markets and, accordingly, with
a slower reallocation of capital and, thus, with slower growth (Cetorelli and Strahan,
2006). Goddard et al. (2004), as well as Hahn (2008), find a negative influence of the
degree of competition on bank profits. The efficient structure hypothesis, by contrast,
assumes that banks with superior management can have lower costs and, therefore,
higher profits. These banks will be able to gain market share over time, leading to a
higher market concentration (Berger, 2007). As higher market concentration is likely
to contribute to higher margins, the estimated coefficient in our model is expected to
have a positive sign. Operating expenses (OEM) also seem to play a substantial role
as a determinant of bank performance. Bourke (1989) provides evidence in favor of a
positive relationship between the two variables. The operating costs are proxied by
the ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets; a positive estimated coefficient is
expected because higher operational costs may cause higher profits. We also adopt the
ratio of equity to total assets as a proxy for bank risk aversion (Maudos and Fernandez
de  Guevara,  2004)  and  capital  strength;  higher  risk  aversion  may  lead  to  higher
profits,  therefore,  the  estimated  coefficient  for  CAP  is  expected  to  be  positive.
Measures of the credit risk and asset quality of banks, proxied by the ratio of loan loss
reserves to total loans, is also used as a control driver. Banks with higher ratios of
loan  loss  reserves  face  higher  credit  risk,  which  is  likely  to  be  transferred  to
customers, resulting in higher profitability. Credit risk is considered to be a significant
determinant of profitability since it is related to the presence of bank failures. Jimenez
and Saurina (2006) argue that bank’s lending hazards are much higher during the
boom phase of a cycle than in the midst of a recessionary period. The literature offers
a bunch of explanations for such behavior, i.e. the principal agency problem through
which  managers  aim  at  growth  objectives  instead  of  profitability  targets  (Mester,
1989). As a result, bank managers opt for higher loan growth and lower the quality
loan  standards.  In  addition,  the  herd  behavior  hypothesis  supports  that  bad  loan
mistakes cannot judged accordingly if the majority of bank managers commit them
(Rajan, 2010). The institutional memory hypothesis also argues that in the long run,
loan officers become less skilled or experienced to offer loans to high-risk borrowers
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(Berger and Udell, 2004). The total assets (TA) of the banks are used as a proxy for
bank size. Firm size is a variable that measures the presence of economies of scale in
the industry and the ability to diversity portfolio risks. The factor of economies of
scale could lead to a positive coefficient for profitability, while the second factor leads
to  a  negative  coefficient  if  increased  diversification  leads  to  lower risks  and thus
lower required returns, leaving the true coefficient unclear. A number of authors find
a strong, negative correlation between a banks’ capitalization and their profitability
(Maudos  and  Fernández  de  Guevara,  2004;  Carbó  Valverde  and  Rodríguez
Fernández,  2007).  The  authors  postulate  a  link  between  capitalization  and  risk
aversion. According to this view, banks with a high level of capital and assets are
more  risk  averse  and  ignore  potential  diversification  options  or  other  methods  to
increase  profitability.  Maudos  and Fernández  de Guevara  (2004)  find  that  a  10%
increase in firm size decreases profits by 0.6 percent. Their results are in line with
Kasman et al. (2010) and Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008). Therefore, we define
size  as  total  assets,  proxying  the  size  of  operations;  the  sign  of  the  estimated
coefficient is ambiguous and depends on the net effect of associated credit risk and
economies  of  scale.  LIQ is  the  ratio  of  liquid  assets  to  customer  and  short-term
funding,  proxying  the  liquidity  risk  incurred  by  banks.  The  more  the  demand
liabilities (i.e., customer and short-term funding) of the bank are backed up by liquid
assets, the lower the liquidity risk of the banks and their profitability. In other words,
a negative sign is expected. 
Moreover, we control for the proportion of outside (non-executive) directors
on the board (NONEXE), the separation of the Chairman/CEO positions (SEP), board
size  (BSIZE),  the  presence  of  an  audit  committee  (AUD),  and  gender  diversity
(GEND). Duchin et al. (2010) and Cornelli et al. (2014) argue that the presence of
outside directors to board improves the effectiveness of monitoring and, thus, reduces
agency  problem issues.  By  contrast,  Adams  and  Ferreira  (2007)  and  Kumar  and
Sivaramakrishnan (2008) present supportive evidence that if outside directors monitor
CEOs too intensely, then they risk alienation, leading to losing access to key strategic
information. In that case, outside directors can face a type of ‘informational moral
hazard,  making  them ineffectual  monitors  of  board  activities  and  to  deteriorating
financial performance. Pi and Timme (1993) suggest that the separation of the CEO
and Chairman positions leads to a greater congruence between owners’ interests and
ve8
corporate  activities.  By  contrast,  the  duality  between  the  two  positions  could
exacerbate principal-agent incentive conflicts. The presence of audit committees helps
the  performance  of  certain  important  corporate  governance  functions,  such  as
strengthening the independence of outside directors, and providing valuable advice on
operational, auditing, financial reporting, and regulatory and fiscal issues. All these
help to mitigate agency costs arising from the separation of ownership from control
(Defond et  al.,  2005).  Finally,  Adams and Ferreira  (2009)  argue  that  the  average
effect of gender diversity on firm performance is negative. The financial performance
could also be affected by the presence of certain two-way multiplicative interaction
terms,  i.e.  that  between the  financial  expertise  and the size  of  the board-INTER1
(given  that  the  overall  effectiveness  of  financial  expertise  on  the  board  could  be
enhanced in conjunction with the knowledge and experience of other non-financial
board members-Anderson et al., 2011), and that between financial expertise and that
between financial expertise and outside (non-executive) directors)-INTER2. To avoid
potential  multicollinearity,  the  component  variables  of  the  interaction  terms  are
centered at their mean values prior to the estimation analysis (Jaccard et al., 1990).
The  empirical  analysis  employs  the  methodology  of  the  system  General
Method of Moments for panel data (GMM). This approach has been developed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Bond et al. (2001) argue
that this method is able to correct unobserved bank heterogeneity, omitted variable
bias, measurement errors, and potential endogeneity that frequently affect estimations.
The approach combines in a system the relevant regressions expressed both in first-
differences and in levels. First-differencing checks for unobserved heterogeneity and
omitted variable bias, as well as for time-invariant components of the measurement
error. It also corrects endogeneity bias (time-varying components) via instrumenting
the explanatory variables.  Estimating two equations in a system GMM can reduce
potential bias associated with a simple first-difference GMM estimator (Arrellano and
Bover,  1995;  Blundell  and  Bond,  1998).  The  consistency  of  the  GMM estimator
depends on the validity of the instruments. Moreover, two specification tests are used.
First, Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests for the overall
validity of the instruments, with the null hypothesis being that all instruments as a
group are exogenous. The second test examines the null hypothesis that the error term
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of the differenced equation is not serially correlated, particularly, at the second order
(AR2). We should not reject the null hypothesis of both tests.
However,  the  lack  of  knowledge  about  the  properties  of  GMM estimators
when N is small renders them a sort of a black box. Moreover, a practical problem
refers to fact that the low number of cross-units may prevent the use of the full set of
instruments available, implying that, in order to make estimation possible, the number
of instruments must be reduced. Given the relatively small size our empirical analysis
uses  (i.e.,  656  observations),  the  GMM estimations  make  use  of  the  Windmeijer
(2005)  finite  sample  correction  for  standard  errors.  In  addition,  the  asymptotic
efficiency  gains  brought  about  by  the  additional  orthogonality  conditions  of  the
system GMM estimator do not come without a cost. More specifically, the number of
instruments  tends to increase exponentially  with the number of time periods. This
proliferation  of  instruments  leads  to a  finite  sample  bias  due to  the overfitting  of
endogenous  variables  and  increases  the  likelihood  of  false  positive  results  and
suspiciously high pass rates of specification tests.  To avoid some misspecification
problems,  the  empirical  analysis  follows  Roodman  (2009)  approach  and  presents
findings with a collapsed instrument matrix and, thus, uses only up to two lags for the
GMM estimators.
III. Data
Data for 41 UK banks (the full list is provided in Appendix A) are obtained, spanning
the period 2001 to 2016. Data (based on the availability of information on the number
of  financial  expertise  on their  Boards)  were obtained primarily  from the  Bank of
England,  Datastream,  Bankscope  and  various  annual  reports.  Full  details  of  all
variables, along with their sources, included in the empirical analysis can be found in
Table 1. Finally, smaller and most specialized banks, such as Tesco Personal Finance
Ltd, Vanquis Bank Ltd, Southsea Mortgage & Investment Co Ltd, Marks and Spencer
Financial Services Plc, Smith & Williamson Investment Management Ltd, etc. were
not  included.  Their  omission  from  the  analysis  is  justified  on  the  basis  of  their
specialization and it should not bias the obtained results. The included banks are all
classified as UK in the Bank of England’s statement that: “Institutions included within
the United Kingdom banking sector – nationality analysis”.
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[Insert Table 1 about here]
In terms of financial expertise, our analysis follows that by Guner et al. (2008) and
Minton et al. (2014) where an independent director is classified as the person who i)
has held an executive position at a bank, ii) holds an executive position at a non-bank
financial institution, iii) holds a finance-related position (i.e., chief financial officer,
accountant, treasurer, and vice-president of finance) at a non-financial firm, iv) holds
an academic  position  in a  related  field,  v) works  as a  hedge fund or equity fund
manager  or  venture  capitalist.  To  the  end of  the  empirical  analysis,  the  financial
expertise variable is measured as the fraction of reported independent directors who
are classified as financial experts based on the above definition. Figure 1 illustrates
some graphical descriptive statistics on financial expertise. In particular, it highlights
that the fraction of financial experts across independent directors increases from 21%
to 25% in the period 2001-2016. Moreover, the average board size decreases very
slowly,  from 12.14 to  11.35 within  the same period.  Finally,  board  independence
increases from 67% in 2001 to 72% in 2016, with the two figures being substantially
high across the same period.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
IV. Empirical Analysis
Financial Expertise and Bank Performance: Baseline Results-All Banks
Table 2 reports OLS fixed effects estimates. More specifically, a variety of findings is
reported in Table 2, where the first three columns present the bivariate (without the
control)  variables  across  the three definitions  of profitability,  while  the remaining
three columns report the full model (including the control variables) across the same
three definitions of profitability. The financial performance of banking institutions is
expressed  by three  representative  indicators:  i)  the  (log)  of  the  Return  on  Assets
(ROA), ii)  the (log) of the Return on Equity (ROE), and iii)  the (log) of the Net
Interest Margin (NIM). The first rate indicates the returns generated by the assets held
by a bank and is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets, as a percentage.
The second rate shows the return on shareholder funds and is measured as the ratio of
net income to equity, expressed as a percentage. Finally, net interest margin is defined
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as the net interest income (i.e., interest income minus interest expenses) expressed as
a percentage of earning assets and reflects the profit obtained by a bank from interest-
earning activities. However, before discussing the OLS estimates, we note that the p-
values of the Hausman test across all six specifications clearly indicates not only the
rejection  of  the  random  effects  null  hypothesis,  but  also  the  fact  that  the  OLS
modelling  approach suffers  from the presence of  endogeneity,  thus,  rendering  the
results  not  valid.  Moreover,  Hermalin  and Weisbach (2003) mention  that  the key
concern  of  any  board  structure  analysis  is  the  presence  of  endogeneity  of  board
structure. Therefore, given the presence of endogeneity, OLS results tend to be biased
and inconsistent. Therefore, the analysis adopts an instrumental type of methodology,
such that of the GMM method that explicitly  considers the endogeneity bias.  The
GMM results are reported in Table 3.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The exogenous instruments the analysis has employed come from two groups, the
control variables in levels and the control variables in first differences, plus a constant
term. More specifically, in terms of the (1) modelling specification, the instruments
from the level  group are:  lags  2 and 3 for  profitability,  lags  1 and 2 for  finance
expertise and lags 1 and 2 for independent directors, while the instruments from the
first-differenced group are: lags 2 and 43 for profitability, lag 1 for finance expertise
and lag 1 for independent directors, plus a constant making that 11 instruments for
specification (1). A similar approach has been chosen for the remaining specification,
only in cases that more control  variables  are  included,  the number of instruments
increases. The number of those instruments used is denoted in the diagnostics section
of Table 3, while their validity is confirmed by the Sargan/Hansen test, also reported
in the same section of the table.  
The empirical findings in the first three columns document that in the overall
period the percentage of independent directors is positive for bank profitability. At the
same time, the percentage of financial expertise has also a positive impact on bank
profitability. In the remaining three columns we have included all the above discussed
control  variables.  In terms of our primary variable,  that  of financial  expertise,  the
findings  remain  consistently  the  same  across  all  three  alternative  definitions  of
profitability.  In  terms  of  the  remaining  controls,  the  estimations  seem  to  be  in
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accordance  with  the  majority  of  empirical  findings  in  the  literature,  i.e.  industry
concentration,  operation expenses management,  credit risk, and equity capital  ratio
have all a positive effect on bank profitability, while total assets and the liquidity ratio
exert a negative impact on profitability. The board size though turns out to have a
negative effect on bank profitability, it is statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, that
is an indication that smaller boards could actually be better suited to the complex and
risky business of banking. Another notable feature gleaned from the results reported
in Table  3 is  the positive sign of the Audit  Committee  coefficient,  indicating  the
beneficial impact of the presence of such a committee on the profitability of banking
institutions. These results imply that the presence of financial experts on boards, and
therefore,  on  audit  committees,  could  be  an  essential  prerequisite  for  effective
governance and, thus, the realization of sound bank performance,  i.e.  profitability.
Moreover, the separation of the Chair and CEO positions has a weak positive impact
on bank profitability, with similar (negative) results obtained in terms of the presence
of an audit committee. The presence of more females as directors seems to exert a
positive effect on bank profitability. The findings in Table 4 also report the estimates
for potential conjoint effects between board financial experts and board size, as well
as  between board  financial  experts  and independent  directors.   These  results  also
highlight that the contribution of financial experts to banks’ performance is mitigated
by  large  boards  with  potentially  many  non-financial  members  with  conflicting
strategic  views.  By contrast,  the  second interaction  term turns  out  to  be  positive,
suggesting  that  the  contribution  of  financial  experts  to  banks’  performance  is
enhanced by the stronger presence of outside directors on banks’ boards. 
If we focus on the multivariate modelling specifications (columns 4 through 6)
we  could  also  attempt  to  interpret  the  economic  significance  of  the  estimated
coefficients of the percentage of financial experts in the board. More specifically, the
coefficient of 0.493 (in relevance to the ROA measure of profitability) indicates that
when the proportion of financial experts’ representation increases by 10 percentage
points, ROA is predicted to change by about 4.93 percentage points. Given that the
average  bank profitability  in  the  sample  in  the year  2016 was approximately  969
million  pounds,  a 4.93 percentage  increase  is  translated  into an increase in  banks
profitability  by  47.77  million  pounds.  Similarly,  for  the  other  two  estimated
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coefficients for ROE (0.485) and NIM (0.502), profitability increases by 46.99 and
48.64 million pounds, respectively.
All  the relevant  diagnostics are reported at  the bottom of Table 3. For the
validity  of  the  instruments,  the  results  need  to  reject  the  test  for  second-order
autocorrelation, AR(2), in the error variances. It is evident that the test for AR(2) of
disturbances fails to reject the respective null. Thus, this test supports the validity of
the  instruments  used.  The  table  also  reports  the  Hansen  test  for  overidentifying
restrictions. In the estimation process, instruments (per modeling specification) were
generated  as  we  used  two  lags  for  levels  and  three  lags  for  difference  in  the
regressors.  As  the  number  of  instruments  was  by  far  lower  than  the  number  of
observations, it did not create any identification problem, as reflected in the Hansen
test.  Reported Hansen test  results fail  to detect  any problem in the validity  of the
instruments  used  in  the  estimation  approach.  Finally,  the  explanatory  power  of
models, through the R-squared metrics, is highlighted to be strong enough, especially
across all three multivariate modeling specifications.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Financial Expertise and Bank Risk
Given  the  mixed  evidence  presented  in  the  introductory  section  on  the  value  of
financial experts participating in the board of directors of banking institutions, this
subsection explores whether the presence of such financial  experts on the board is
also associated with more risk taking and whether the risks taken create value for
shareholders. In particular, the empirical analysis considers the concept of credit risk,
defined as non-performing loans to gross loans as a direct ex-post measure of credit
risk (Barth et al., 2004; González, 2005). Moreover, the determinants of credit risk are
considered to be the bank size (measured by total assets value) (González, 2005; de
Haan  and  Poghosyan,  2012),  bank  capitalization  (Delis  et  al.,  2011),  market
concentration  (Alen  and  Gale,  2004;  Beck  and  Demirgüç-Kunt,  2013),  and  GDP
growth (Jimenez et  al.,  2008; Louzis et  al.,  2012). Data for the new variables are
obtained from the Bankscope database over the same time span, i.e. 2001 to 2016,
while more details are also provided in Table 1.
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Table 3a presents GMM coefficient estimates for the underlying association.
First,  bank size has  a  negative  and significant  effect  on credit  risk,  implying that
banks with larger sizes can better control this type of risk. Second, bank capitalization
has a significant negative effect on credit risk. Third, bank competition seems to be an
important  factor in reducing the exposure to credit  risk. Finally,  the coefficient of
GDP growth is negative and has a significantly impact on credit risk. Next, focusing
on our primary variables,  the findings illustrate that there is a positive association
between  financial  expertise  and  credit  risk.  These  findings  are  consistent  with
financial experts acting in the interest of shareholders, as these shareholders benefit
from more risk-taking. Merton (1977) has already provided empirical support to this
observation on the grounds that the shareholders’ cost of capital does not reflect the
riskiness  of  their  assets.  In  addition,  this  positive  link  is  consistent  with  a  more
financially  knowledgeable  board  having  a  better  understanding  of  complex
investments  and  potentially  encouraging  bank  management  to  increase  their  risk
taking.
[Insert Table 3a about here]
Board Characteristics and Stock Market Performance
This part of the empirical analysis explores the potential impact of financial expertise
of the board on the stock performance of the banking institutions under consideration
by  following  the  model  suggested  by  Minton  et  al.  (2014).  To  this  end,  we  are
assuming a stock market performance model in which cumulated stock returns are a
function of total assets, the equity-capital ratio, the beta of the stock  computed as the
market beta estimated from a market model in which daily stock returns are regressed
on value-weighted market returns and the returns on the UK 31-day Treasury bill,
total  loans,  real  estate  loans  (measuring  real  estate  exposure),  mortgage-backed
securities  held-to-maturity,  total  deposits,  short-term financing defined as the non-
deposit  short-term  financing  to  total  assets  ratio,  and  off-balance  sheet  activities
measured as the off balance sheet securitized assets (i.e., home equity, credit cards,
auto loans, etc.) to total assets ratio. Data were obtained from Orbis database and span
the same period as before. The same variables of financial expertise variables have
been also included in the analysis.
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The new results are reported in Table 4 and provide supportive information to
those presented in table 3. In particular, the empirical findings, reported in terms of
the model without the control variables, document that the percentage of independent
directors exerts a positive impact on bank stock performance. At the same time, the
percentage of financial expertise has also a positive effect on the same performance.
In the second column, where the model includes all the relevant control variables, in
terms  of  our  primary  variable,  that  of  financial  expertise,  the  findings  remain
consistently similar as those in the first column. In terms of the remaining controls,
the estimations seem to be in accordance with the literature; assets, the capital equity
ratio and the beta factor are positively and significantly related to stock performance
across  both specifications.  The total  deposits  to  assets  ratio  also  exerts  a  positive
effect on stock returns, while both the total loans to assets ratio and the real estate
loans to assets ratio have a negative impact on stock performance. Finally, mortgage-
backed securities, short-term financing and off-balance sheet activities to total assets
ratios have a positive effect on stock performance.
 [Insert Table 4 about here]
Financial Expertise and Bank Performance: The Effect of the 2007/2008 Crisis
To examine the role of the 2007/2008 global financial  crisis  for the link between
banks’ financial performance (profitability) and the number of financial experts in UK
bank  boards,  the  empirical  analysis  conducts  a  sensitivity  test  by  partitioning  the
panel sample into two sub-periods, i.e. the period from 2001 up to 2007 (when the
crisis broke out in the UK) and the period from 2008 and up to 2012 (when the crisis
ended). The results are reported In Panels A and B, respectively in Table 5. In terms
of our primary variable  of interest,  i.e.  the number of financial  experts  on banks’
boards, the new findings document the consistency of the results presented in Table 3,
but this time the estimates over the crisis period are stronger versus their counterparts
in  the period prior to the crisis  event.  The number of financial  experts  on banks’
boards exerts a stronger impact on the profitability of banking institutions, indicating
that  during  stressful  (financial)  times  the  knowledge  and  experience  of  board
members are considered a valuable asset for the course of their profitability. In both
panels the remaining control variables retain their sign.
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[Insert Table 5 about here]
Financial Expertise and Bank Performance: Excluding the Big Four
This part of the empirical analysis repeats the estimation procedure, but this time it
excludes the so called big four banks, i.e. HSBC, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland,
Lloyds Banking Group. Based on the significance of those four banks for the UK
banking system, we can explore whether by excluding banks that differ in risk-taking
policies may alter the preceding results. The reason for selecting those big four banks
is that they manage over 75% of UK current accounts and 85% of business accounts.
They also hold more than 5trillion pounds in total assets and employ approximately
560,000 employees (as in 2016). According to Laeven et al. (2016), the theory of the
“too-big-to-fail” policies argues that because the governments are reluctant to close
“big” banks in the fear of contagious bank runs and financial panic in the economy,
these banks tend to take on excessive risk as they are aware of the government backup
even in the worst case of failure. In addition, the “unstable banking” theory predicts
that commercial banks are more likely to engage in touch-and-go activities, such as
trading or leveraging their financial position using short-term debt and moving away
from their  traditional  business of accepting deposits and making loans as they are
getting bigger, which make them more susceptible to liquidity and insolvency risk
(Shleifer and Vishny 2010; Bhagat et al.,  2015). Finally,  the “agency cost” theory
supports that as the banks are growing in size and pursuing a complex of different
business  activities,  their  organizational  structure  would  become  more  perplexing,
which  consequently  exacerbates  agency  problem  together  with  other  governance
issues (Laeven and Levine, 2007).
The analysis reruns the findings reported in Table 3 and the new results are
presented  in  Table  6.  They  indicate  that  the  percentage  of  financial  expertise  on
banks’ boards continues to exert a positive effect on banks’ profitability, but this time
the impact is weaker. These findings could probably indicate that this expertise seems
to be significantly less important for smaller banks that do not tend to undertake high
risks,  since it  will  be much more difficult  for them to cope with it,  especially  in
stressful times. Once again, the remaining drivers retain their theoretical significance,
albeit at weaker levels.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
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Financial Expertise and Bank Performance: The Role of the Profession
This  strand of  the  robustness  test  explicitly  considers  the  effect  of  three  specific
categories of financial expertise, i.e. financial and banking professors, professionally
qualified accountants, and financial experts from other industries, on the same number
of measures of banking industry profitability considered before, i.e. return on assets,
return on equity, and net profit margin.
Table 7 provides the results for each of the three types of financial experts
defined above. They document that board-level financial and banking professor, as
well  as financial  experts from other industries play a positive role in terms of the
banks’  profitability.  These  findings  remain  consistently  similar  across  all  three
definitions of profitability. By contrast, professionally qualified accountants are not
significantly related to bank profitability.  Moreover,  the findings provide evidence
that  the  three  interaction  terms  of  financial  experts  with  the  three  types  of
professionals  are  positive,  implying  that  the  contribution  of  financial  experts  to
profitability could be enhanced by the liaisons between different board-level financial
experts, i.e. the synergies developed by those professions could have tangible clear
benefits for the profitability of banking institutions.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Financial  Expertise,  Bank  Performance  and  Credit  Risk:  The  Case  of  the  Large
Banks
Given that our sample includes deposit-taking institutions, many of which are small,
the policy implications could be less clear-cut if the results are driven just by small
banks only. After all, large banks have been at the center of the 2008 global financial
crisis, since their distress has caused serious damage to the real economy. This has
triggered a heated debate on the optimal size and the organizational complexity of
banks  (Viñals  et  al.,  2013).  Large  banks  usually  generate  more  individual  and
systemic risk than smaller banks, especially when they have insufficient capital  or
unstable funding, which are very common features of large banks. Additionally, large
banks generate more systemic risk when they engage more in market-based activities
or are more organizationally complex. The presence of more finance expertise in the
boards of such large banks will enhance the impact on credit risk since those financial
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experts  can  easier  convince  the  management  of  those  banks  to  undertake  riskier
activities,  leading  them  probably  to  higher  profitability.  If  this  is  the  case,  the
implications  are  expected  to  be  very  novel  and  crucial:  the  higher  systemic  risk
implies  that  risky  activities  may  be  insufficiently  addressed  by  micro-prudential
regulation, which focuses only on individual bank risk, while targeting bank activities
and complexity may need to be undertaken in the context of a wider macro-prudential
framework. Accordingly, to reduce the systemic risk in large banks, policies need to
take  into  consideration  the  disproportional  role  of  large  banks  (Philippon,  2010;
Arcand et al., 2012).
Therefore, this part of the empirical analysis does some subsample analysis to
demonstrate whether the findings can be held for larger banks as well (this point has
been raised by a referee). To this end, we repeat the above analysis by including the
four large banks we had excluded in a previous step of the analysis. Tables 8 and 9
report the results on the impact of finance expertise on boards on bank profitability
and credit risk, respectively. The findings in Table 8 clearly indicate that across all
specifications,  financial  expertise  among board  members  in  large  banks though it
remains  positive  in  association  with  bank profitability,  the impact  is  weaker  with
respect to that for smaller banks, indicating the consistency of the argument that large
banks  with  more  financial  expertise  on  their  board  are  associated  with  lower
profitability probably leading up to financial crises. This could be attributed to the fact
that the asset quality (i.e., a higher proportion of non-performing loans) of those banks
has significantly deteriorated (Bernanke et al., 1991; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007;
Klein, 2013).  
As  Table  9  reports,  in  the  sample  of  large  banks  the  impact  of  finance
expertise on their boards on credit risk is stronger. The coefficient estimates across all
modelling specifications are larger and more statistically significant than they are for
the sample of smaller banks (Table 6). This positive and stronger association could be
attributed to the interpretation provided above, according to which financial experts
may easier influence and/or sanction the decision making of senior bank management
in  the  case  of  larger  banks,  since  these  banks  tend  to  attract  the  most  exquisite
professional  and  academics  in  the  business,  thus,  putting  more  faith  to  their
suggestions in undertaking riskier banking activities (Shi et al., 2017). These findings
come in contrast to the arguments presented in the literature that large banks are more
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effective in controlling problem loans, because they have advanced technologies and
skilled manpower to tactfully handle moral hazard and agency problems (Rajan and
Dhal 2003), or because large banks are more capable of collecting ample relevant
information  related  to  borrowers,  enabling  them to take correct  lending decisions.
What our findings indicate is that large banks may have seriously considered advise
from financial  experts  on  their  board  and  have  expanded  their  activities  in  risky
sectors to  achieve monopoly profit,  an action that  increases the proportion of bad
loans and cause market failures (Gennaioli et al., 2013). 
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here]
Financial Expertise and Bank Performance: Evidence by the Type of Banks
The UK institutions  the empirical  analysis  has considered in  the sample are  quite
heterogeneous.  This  type  of  heterogeneity  is  primarily  attributed  to  differences  in
business  models  of  these  institutions,  implying  that  the  need  for  and  effects  of
financial expertise could differ by type of institution. The sample includes commercial
banks,  mortgage  banks,  investment  banks,  and  others  (general  financial  services,
financial services to charities, trade unions, special business and other organizations).
There were cases in which a bank was involved in more than one type of activities;
therefore, our classification is based on the major proportion the bank’s loan activities
focuses on, e.g. commercial/retailing,  investment,  financial  services, mortgage, and
other. Hence, based on a referee’s comments, this part of the analysis re-examines the
impact  of  financial  expertise  on  the  boards  of  directors  on  banks’  financial
performance by differentiating  the type of the banking institution.  The banks that
belong in each type of services provided are presented in Appendix B.
The  new findings,  with  respect  to  the  ROA definition  of  profitability,  are
presented in Table 10 (the empirical findings with respect to the other two definitions
generated similar results and they are not reported here). The decomposed findings
clearly illustrate that the effect of financial expertise in the board of directors on bank
profitability remains positive in the cases of commercial, investment and other types
of banks. Surprisingly, financial expertise exerts a negative impact on profitability in
the case of mortgage banks, probably indicating that financial experts have largely
contributed to real estate exposures of those bank institutions,  a fact that deserves
further research in future venues. 
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[Insert Table 10 about here]
V. Conclusion
Using panel data, spanning the period 2001 to 2016 from the UK banking industry (41
UK banks), this study examined the pooled impact on three profitability indicators of
the presence of financial experts on banking boards of directors, as well as the role of
three  professional  types  of  those  financial  experts,  i.e.  financial  and  banking
professors,  qualified  professional  accountants  and  financial  experts  from  other
industries.  The  results  provided  evidence  that  overall  financial  experts  have  a
beneficial  impact  on  the  profitability  of  UK  banks.  Furthermore,  the  evidence
demonstrated that board-level qualified accountants were not statistically linked with
profitability across all three definitions. By contrast, the other two professional groups
are significantly associated with sound profitability measures. These results imply that
the group of professional accountants may not be as adept at group-level profitability
enhancement as financial and banking professors, as well as financial experts from
other  industries.  This  insight  could  usefully  inform banking  regulators  and  shape
future corporate governance guidelines for the banking industry. The findings indicate
that board-level financial expertise may be of high importance for realizing sound and
sustainable corporate performance. 
Moreover, the analysis investigated the role of the financial expertise factor in
banks credit risk. The results provided evidence of a positive link between these two
variables. Such findings seem to challenge the regulators’ view that more financial
expertise on the boards of banks would unambiguously lower their risk profile. In that
sense, financial experts are more willing to let their bank participate in more risk-
taking activities because they tend to believe that their familiarity and understanding
of complex financial instruments could assist them in coping with stressful financial
and economic environments. However, this turns out not to be the case with respect to
the  UK banks.  Finally,  the  decomposition  of  banks  per  type  of  activity  provided
robust support to the results across all types of banks, except those in the real estate
business.
The empirical analysis provides results which could stimulate further research
venues on the role of board-level financial experts on financial decisions in banking.
Moreover,  given  that  the  notion  of  risk  taking  by banks  is  an  important  key  for
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understanding  the  link  between  performance  and  board  composition,  if  more
financially-knowledgeable board members are better in assessing certain risks, then
they might be able to advise the (senior) bank management to avoid certain risks,
while alternatively, they might recognize risks that are worth undertaking and which
would benefit the shareholders. 
APPENDIX A. Full list of 41 UK banks
HSBC Bank Plc, Barclays Bank Plc, The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, Lloyds Bank
Plc, Arbuthnot Latham & Co Limited, Bradford & Bingley Plc, Consolidated Credits
Bank  Limited,  Ruffler  Bank  Plc,  Schroder  &  Co  Ltd,  Standard  Chartered  Bank,
Standard Life Bank, Abbey National Treasury Services Plc, Adam & Company Plc,
AIB Group (UK) Plc, Aldermore Bank Plc, Atom Bank PLC, Bank and Clients PLC,
Bank of Scotland Plc, CIBC World Markets Plc, Close Brothers Limited, Clydesdale
Bank  Plc,  The Co-operative  Bank Plc,  Diamond  Bank (UK) Plc,  FCE Bank Plc,
Gatehouse Bank Plc, Hampden & Co Plc, Hampshire Trust Bank Plc, ICBC Standard
Bank Plc, Investec Bank PLC, Metro Bank PLC, National  Westminster  Bank Plc,
OneSavings Bank Plc, Sainsbury’s Bank Plc, Secure Trust Bank Plc, Tesco Personal
Finance Plc,  TSB Bank Plc,  Union Bank (UK) Plc,  Unity Trust Bank Plc,  Virgin
Money  Plc,  VTB  Capital  Plc,  Wyelands  Bank  Plc)  [Source:
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/authorisations/which-firms-
does-the-pra-regulate]. (41)
APPENDIX B. Banks classification by type of services
Commercial banks: HSBC Bank Plc, The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, Lloyds Bank
Plc, Arbuthnot Latham & Co Limited, Consolidated Credits Bank Limited, Ruffler
Bank  Plc,  Standard  Life  Bank,  Adam  &  Company  Plc,  AIB  Group  (UK)  Plc,
Aldermore Bank Plc, Atom Bank PLC, Bank and Clients PLC, Bank of Scotland Plc,
Clydesdale Bank Plc, The Co-operative Bank Plc, FCE Bank Plc, Hampden & Co Plc,
ICBC  Standard  Bank  Plc,  Metro  Bank  PLC,  National  Westminster  Bank  Plc,
Sainsbury’s Bank Plc,  Secure Trust  Bank Plc,  TSB Bank Plc,  Virgin Money Plc,
Wyelands Bank Plc. (25)
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Mortgage banks: Bradford & Bingley Plc, Abbey National Treasury Services Plc,
Gatehouse Bank Plc, OneSavings Bank Plc. (4)
Investment banks: Barclays Bank Plc, Schroder & Co Ltd, Standard Chartered Bank,
CIBC World Markets Plc, Close Brothers Limited, Diamond Bank (UK) Plc, Investec
Bank PLC, VTB Capital Plc. (8)
Other banks (Financial services to charities, trade unions, special business and
other organizations): Tesco Personal Finance Plc, Unity Trust Bank Plc, Hampshire
Trust Bank Plc, Union Bank (UK) Plc. (4) 
TABLE 1. Variables Definition.
The table provides the definition of all variables included in the empirical analysis,
along with the source of evidence for those variables.
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables   Source
_____________________________________________________________________
Financial experts: % financial experts 
across independent directors Annual reports
Independent directors: 
% independent directors Annual reports
Returns on assets Datastream
Returns on equity Datastream
Net interest margin: interest 
income minus interest expenses 
divided by total assets Datastream
Industry concentration: Herfindahl 
index-the sum of the squares of the 
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market shares of the banks 
within the industry Bankscope/Orbis
Operation expenses management:
All expenses relating to the ordinary 
and regular banking business, particularly 
salaries and other employee benefits, 
including transfers to pension reserves (staff costs), 
and expenses for property and equipment 
and related depreciation expenses. 
Taxes other than income or corporate
taxes are also included Bankscope/Orbis
Credit risk: NPLs/Total loans Bankscope/Orbis
Total assets Datastream
Equity capital ratio: total book
equity divided by total assets Datastream




Chair/CEO position: A dummy
variable which takes 1 if the
Chair holds a CEO position, and
0 otherwise Annual reports
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Board size: the total number of
Board members Annual reports
Audit committee: a dummy
variable which takes 1 if the
bank has such a committee, and
0 otherwise Annual reports
Gender: A dummy variable
which takes 1 for males and
0 for females board members Annual reports
Non-performing loans to gross loans  Bankscope
Bank capitalization Bankscope




TABLE 2. OLS Results: Board of Directors Financial Expertise and Bank Profitability-All Banks.
This table reports OLS fixed effects coefficients from predicting bank profitability proxied by three alternative definitions, i.e. return on assets,
return on equity and net interest margins. The estimates include all 41 banks under consideration. Statistics are based on annual data, spanning
the period 2001- 2016. The estimates are in relevance to six alternative model specifications.  The first three columns present the bivariate
(without the control) variables across the three definitions of profitability, while the remaining three columns report the full model (including the
control variables) across the same three definitions of profitability. Figures in brackets denote p-values, while ***:p≤0.01, **: p≤0.05, *:p≤0.10.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                   (2)                   (3)                   (4)                    (5)                   (6) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profitability (-1) 0.624*** 0.632*** 0.645*** 0.586*** 0.564*** 0.570***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Financial expertise 0.386*** 0.336*** 0.389*** 0.327*** 0.295*** 0.318***
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Independent directors 0.149** 0.125* 0.152** 0.118* 0.112* 0.128**
[0.05] [0.06] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05]
Industry concentration 0.089* 0.081* 0.096*
[0.09] [0.09] [0.08]
Operating expenses management 0.102** 0.087* 0.109**
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[0.05] [0.10] [0.05]
Credit risk 0.052* 0.038* 0.059*
[0.06] [0.08] [0.06]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                   (2)                   (3)                   (4)                   (5)                    (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total assets -0.693*** -0.668*** -0.705***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Equity capital ratio 0.259*** 0.235*** 0.268***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
Liquidity ratio -0.173** -0.148** -0.186***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.01]
Chair/CEO position 0.048* 0.035 0.055*
[0.08] [0.15] [0.07]
Board size -0.008 -0.003 -0.012
[0.23] [0.29] [0.22]
Audit Committee 0.027* 0.020 0.032*
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[0.10] [0.14] [0.09]
Gender 0.037** 0.031* 0.040**
[0.05] [0.07] [0.05]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                  (2)                    (3)                   (4)                   (5)                    (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Financial expertise x board size -0.024** -0.017* -0.029**
[0.05] [0.06] [0.05]
Financial expertise x independent directors 0.030** 0.022** 0.036**
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 1.136** 1.208** 1.175** 0.894* 0.932* 0.852*
[0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.07] [0.06] [0.07]
Diagnostics
R-squared adjusted 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.67 0.62 0.69
Hausman test [0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
Number of observations 656 656 656 656 656 656
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 3. GMM Results: Board of Directors Financial Expertise and Bank Profitability-All Banks.
This table reports General Method of Moments (GMM) fixed effects coefficients from predicting bank profitability proxied by three alternative
definitions, i.e. return on assets, return on equity and net interest margins. The estimates include all 41 banks under consideration. Statistics are
based on annual data, spanning the period 2001- 2016. The estimates are in relevance to six alternative model specifications. The first three
columns present the model without the control variables across the three definitions of profitability, while the remaining three columns report the
full model (including the control variables) across the same three definitions of profitability. Figures in brackets denote p-values. AR2 is the test
for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation. Sargan/Hansen is the test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2, under the null of instruments’ validity.
***:p≤0.01, **: p≤0.05, *:p≤0.10.  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
  (1)                   (2)                   (3)                    (4)                   (5)                   (6) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profitability (-1) 0.679*** 0.655*** 0.696*** 0.638*** 0.609*** 0.651***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Financial expertise 0.524*** 0.502*** 0.548*** 0.493*** 0.485*** 0.502***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Independent directors 0.237** 0.214** 0.252** 0.216** 0.197** 0.239**
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04]
Industry concentration 0.114* 0.093* 0.126*
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[0.08] [0.10] [0.08]
Operating expenses management 0.136** 0.112* 0.150**
[0.04] [0.08] [0.04]
Credit risk 0.067** 0.051* 0.072**
[0.05] [0.08] [0.05]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
  (1)                   (2)                   (3)                    (4)                   (5)                   (6) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total assets -0.759*** -0.737*** -0.775***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Equity capital ratio 0.311*** 0.296*** 0.330***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Liquidity ratio -0.209*** -0.183** -0.219***
[0.01] [0.03] [0.00]
Chair/CEO position 0.061* 0.038 0.069**
[0.06] [0.12] [0.02]
Board size -0.012 -0.005 -0.016
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[0.18] [0.24] [0.14]
Audit Committee 0.032* 0.024 0.038*
[0.08] [0.11] [0.07]
Gender 0.042** 0.034* 0.049**
[0.05] [0.06] [0.04]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
  (1)                   (2)                   (3)                    (4)                   (5)                   (6) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Financial expertise x board size -0.028** -0.023** -0.041***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.01]
Financial expertise x independent directors 0.035** 0.028** 0.048***
[0.03] [0.05] [0.01]
Constant 1.068** 1.144** 1.089** 0.836* 0.891* 0.826*
[0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.08] [0.07] [0.08]
Diagnostics
R-squared adjusted 0.46 0.41 0.49 0.85 0.80 0.87
No. of instruments 11 12 13 26 24 27
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AR(2) [0.38] [0.32] [0.41] [0.46] [0.40] [0.52]
Sargan/Hansen test [0.57] [0.53] [0.62] [0.60] [0.55] [0.69]
Number of observations 656 656 656 656 656 656
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 3a. GMM Results: Board of Directors Financial Expertise and Credit
Risk-All Banks.
This  table  reports  General  Method of  Moments  (GMM) fixed  effects  coefficients
from predicting the credit risk, defined as non-performing loans to gross loans as a
direct  ex-post  measure  of  credit  risk.  The  estimates  include  all  41  banks  under
consideration. Statistics are based on annual data, spanning the period 2001- 2016.
The  estimates  are  in  relevance  to  two  alternative  model  specifications.  The  first
column presents the bivariate (without the control) variables, while the second column
reports the full model (including the control variables). Figures in brackets denote p-
values.  AR2 is  the  test  for  second-order  serial  correlation  in  the  first-differenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation.  Sargan/Hansen  is  the  test  of  the  over-identifying  restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as χ2, under the null of instruments’ validity. ***:p≤0.01,
**: p≤0.05.  
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables  (1)    (2) 
_____________________________________________________________________
Financial expertise 0.146*** 0.129***
[0.00] [0.00]


















R-squared adjusted 0.42 0.79
No. of instruments 9 23
AR(2) [0.34] [0.53]
Sargan/Hansen test [0.49] [0.55]
Number of observations 656 656
_____________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 4.  GMM Results:  Board  of  Directors  Financial  Expertise  and  Bank
Stock Performance-All Banks.
This  table  reports  General  Method of  Moments  (GMM) fixed  effects  coefficients
from predicting bank stock performance. The estimates include all 41 banks under
consideration. Statistics are based on annual data, spanning the period 2001- 2016.
The  estimates  are  in  relevance  to  two  alternative  model  specifications.  The  first
column presents the model without the control variables, while the second column
reports  the  full  model  (including  the  control  variables).  Returns  are  measured  as
cumulative  bank  stock  returns.  Log(assets)  is  the  natural  logarithm  of  total  book
assets, the equity capital ratio is defined as total book equity divided by total assets,
the beta risk factor is computed as the market beta estimated from a market model in
which daily stock returns are explained by value-weighted market  returns and the
returns on the 31-day UK Treasury bill.  Mortgage-backed securities are defined as
held-to-maturity  securities,  available-for-sale  and  held  for  trading  relative  to  total
assets, short-term financing is defined as the non-deposit short-term financing to total
asset ratio, while off-balance sheet activities are measured as the off-balance sheet
securitized assets (i.e., home equity, credit card, auto loans, etc.) to total assets ratio.
Data are from the Orbis database. Figures in brackets denote p-values. AR2 is the test
for  second-order  serial  correlation  in  the first-differenced residuals,  asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Sargan/Hansen
is the test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2, under
the null of instruments’ validity. ***:p≤0.01, **: p≤0.05, *:p≤0.10.  
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables  (1)                    (2)                    
_____________________________________________________________________
Returns (-1) 0.514*** 0.486***
[0.00] [0.00]
Financial expertise 0.274*** 0.239***
[0.00] [0.00]








Total loans to assets ratio -0.176**
ve35
[0.05]
Total deposits to assets ratio 0.385***
[0.00]
Real estate to total assets ratio -0.475***
[0.00]
Mortgage backed securities 0.264*
[0.07]
Short-term financing to assets ratio 0.197*
[0.10]








Financial expertise x board size -0.042**
[0.02]





R-squared adjusted 0.29 0.68
No. of instruments 17 31
AR(2) [0.32] [0.51]
Sargan/Hansen test [0.44] [0.58]




TABLE 5. GMM Results: Board of Directors Financial Expertise and Bank Profitability-All Banks-The Role of the 2007/08 Crisis.
This table reports General Method of Moments (GMM) fixed effects coefficients from predicting bank profitability proxied by three alternative
definitions, i.e. return on assets, return on equity and net interest margins. The estimates include all 41 banks and are based on a sensitivity
analysis which partitions the panel sample into two sub-periods, i.e. the period from 2001 up to 2007 (when the crisis broke out in the UK)-Panel
A and the period from 2008 and up to 2012 (when the crisis ended)-Panel B. The estimates include all 41 banks under consideration. Statistics
are based on annual data, spanning the period 2001- 2016. The estimates are in relevance to six alternative model specifications. The first three
columns present the bivariate (without the control) variables across the three definitions of profitability, while the remaining three columns
report the full model (including the control variables) across the same three definitions of profitability. Figures in brackets denote p-values. AR2
is the test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of
no serial correlation. Sargan/Hansen is the test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2, under the null of instruments’
validity. ***:p≤0.01, **: p≤0.05, *:p≤0.10.  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables ROA           ROE          NIM          ROA         ROE          NIM
(1)                 (2)                   (3)                   (4)                  (5)                    (6) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: 2001-2007
Profitability (-1) 0.613*** 0.602*** 0.648*** 0.604*** 0.583*** 0.637***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Financial expertise 0.473*** 0.449*** 0.496*** 0.452*** 0.427*** 0.475***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ve38
Independent directors 0.206** 0.186** 0.228** 0.201** 0.166* 0.221**
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.07] [0.03]
Industry concentration 0.112* 0.097* 0.122*
[0.08] [0.10] [0.07]
Operating expenses management 0.139** 0.116* 0.159**
[0.04] [0.08] [0.03]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                   (2)                   (3)                   (4)                    (5)                   (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Credit risk 0.048* 0.042* 0.061**
[0.06] [0.09] [0.05]
Total assets -0.721*** -0.709*** -0.744***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Equity capital ratio 0.302*** 0.282*** 0.313***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Liquidity ratio -0.201*** -0.174** -0.214***
ve39
[0.01] [0.03] [0.00]
Chair/CEO position 0.050* 0.033 0.064**
[0.07] [0.15] [0.04]
Board size -0.008 -0.003 -0.012
[0.26] [0.30] [0.18]
Audit Committee 0.024* 0.016 0.031*
[0.09] [0.19] [0.08]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                   (2)                   (3)                    (4)                   (5)                   (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gender 0.039** 0.032* 0.045**
[0.05] [0.07] [0.04]
Financial expertise x board size -0.017* -0.011* -0.022**
[0.06] [0.09] [0.05]
Financial expertise x independent directors 0.030** 0.024* 0.036**
[0.04] [0.06] [0.05]
Constant 1.074** 1.185** 1.139** 0.775* 0.796* 0.741*
ve40
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10]
Diagnostics
R-squared adjusted 0.41 0.38 0.44 0.81 0.75 0.83
No. of instruments 9 10 12 25 25 26
AR(2) [0.33] [0.35] [0.40] [0.42] [0.43] [0.55]
Sargan/Hansen test [0.54] [0.50] [0.57] [0.64] [0.51] [0.74]
Number of observations 328 328 328 328 328 328
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                   (2)                   (3)                    (4)                   (5)                   (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel B: 2007-2012
Profitability (-1) 0.698*** 0.665*** 0.714*** 0.649*** 0.623*** 0.677***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Financial expertise 0.536*** 0.520*** 0.568*** 0.507*** 0.498*** 0.526***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Independent directors 0.244** 0.221** 0.270*** 0.224** 0.206** 0.252**
[0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.04] [0.04] [0.02]
ve41
Industry concentration 0.118* 0.091* 0.121*
[0.07] [0.10] [0.08]
Operating expenses management 0.132** 0.109* 0.144**
[0.04] [0.08] [0.04]
Credit risk 0.064** 0.047* 0.068**
[0.05] [0.08] [0.05]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                   (2)                   (3)                   (4)                   (5)                    (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total assets -0.772*** -0.746*** -0.789***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Equity capital ratio 0.324*** 0.305*** 0.343***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Liquidity ratio -0.216*** -0.199** -0.235***
[0.01] [0.03] [0.00]
Chair/CEO position 0.068** 0.040 0.080***
ve42
[0.05] [0.11] [0.01]
Board size -0.018 -0.010 -0.024
[0.14] [0.20] [0.11]
Audit Committee 0.039* 0.030* 0.046**
[0.06] [0.10] [0.05]
Gender 0.040** 0.033* 0.046**
[0.05] [0.06] [0.03]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                  (2)                    (3)                   (4)                    (5)                   (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Financial expertise x board size -0.033** -0.026** -0.049***
[0.02] [0.04] [0.01]
Financial expertise x independent directors 0.040** 0.033** 0.059***
[0.02] [0.04] [0.01]
Constant 1.209*** 1.194*** 1.195*** 0.928** 0.896** 0.937**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02]
Diagnostics
ve43
R-squared adjusted 0.47 0.43 0.50 0.87 0.83 0.89
No. of instruments 12 10 11 23 21 24
AR(2) [0.40] [0.35] [0.40] [0.49] [0.37] [0.56]
Sargan/Hansen test [0.52] [0.56] [0.60] [0.57] [0.51] [0.65]
Number of observations 328 328 328 328 328 328
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 6. GMM Results: Board of Directors Financial Expertise and Bank Profitability-Excluding the Big Four Banks.
This table reports General Method of Moments (GMM) fixed effects coefficients from predicting bank profitability proxied by three alternative
definitions, i.e. return on assets, return on equity and net interest margins. The estimates include 37 banks by excluding the so called big four
banks, i.e. HSBC, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Lloyds Banking Group. Based on the significance of those four banks for the UK
banking system, the estimates try to highlight whether by excluding banks that differ in risk-taking policies may alter the preceding results.
Statistics are based on annual data, spanning the period 2001- 2016. The estimates are in relevance to six alternative model specifications. The
first three columns present the bivariate (without the control) variables across the three definitions of profitability, while the remaining three
columns report the full model (including the control variables) across the same three definitions of profitability. Figures in brackets denote p-
values. AR2 is the test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation. Sargan/Hansen is the test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ 2, under the null
of instruments’ validity. ***:p≤0.01, **: p≤0.05, *:p≤0.10.  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables ROA           ROE          NIM          ROA          ROE          NIM
(1)                 (2)                  (3)                    (4)                   (5)                    (6) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profitability (-1) 0.658*** 0.646*** 0.678*** 0.629*** 0.601*** 0.644***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Financial expertise 0.481*** 0.466*** 0.524*** 0.475*** 0.459*** 0.490***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Independent directors 0.219** 0.202** 0.239** 0.207** 0.184** 0.221**
ve45
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05] [0.03]
Industry concentration 0.109* 0.085* 0.115*
[0.08] [0.10] [0.07]
Operating expenses management 0.133** 0.106* 0.145**
[0.04] [0.09] [0.03]
Credit risk 0.062** 0.044* 0.070**
[0.05] [0.09] [0.05]
Variables ROA           ROE          NIM             ROA             ROE             NIM
(1)                (2)                   (3)                      (4)                    (5)                   (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total assets 0.744*** 0.731*** 0.763***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Equity capital ratio 0.302*** 0.287*** 0.323***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Liquidity ratio -0.202*** -0.175** -0.212***
[0.01] [0.04] [0.00]
Chair/CEO position 0.055* 0.032 0.061**
ve46
[0.07] [0.14] [0.03]
Board size -0.010 -0.004 -0.012
[0.20] [0.25] [0.17]
Audit Committee 0.029* 0.021 0.032*
[0.09] [0.14] [0.08]
Gender 0.040** 0.033* 0.045**
[0.05] [0.06] [0.05]
Variables ROA           ROE          NIM             ROA             ROE            NIM
(1)                 (2)                   (3)                      (4)                   (5)                   (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Financial expertise x board size -0.025** -0.020** -0.036**
[0.04] [0.05] [0.02]
Financial expertise x independent directors 0.032** 0.025** 0.043***
[0.04] [0.05] [0.01]
Constant 1.018** 1.064** 1.008** 0.829* 0.865** 0.814*
[0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.07]
Diagnostics
ve47
R-squared adjusted 0.40 0.37 0.44 0.82 0.77 0.83
No. of instruments 12 12 14 24 25 27
AR(2) [0.32] [0.29] [0.36] [0.41] [0.37] [0.48]
Sargan/Hansen test [0.53] [0.51] [0.57] [0.52] [0.51] [0.62]
Number of observations 592 592 592 592 592 592
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 7. GMM Results: Board of Directors Financial Expertise and Bank Profitability-All Banks-the Role of the Profession.
This table reports General Method of Moments (GMM) fixed effects coefficients from predicting bank profitability proxied by three alternative
definitions, i.e. return on assets, return on equity and net interest margins. The estimates include all 41 banks. Financial experts have been
explicitly  classified  into three  specific  categories,  i.e.  financial  and banking professors,  professionally  qualified  accountants,  and financial
experts  from other  industries.  Statistics  are  based on annual  data,  spanning the period 2001- 2016.  The estimates  are  in  relevance  to  six
alternative model specifications. The first three columns present the bivariate (without the control) variables across the three definitions of
profitability,  while the remaining three columns report the full model (including the control variables) across the same three definitions of
profitability.  Figures  in  brackets  denote  p-values.  AR2  is  the  test  for  second-order  serial  correlation  in  the  first-differenced  residuals,
asymptotically  distributed  as  N(0,1)  under  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  serial  correlation.  Sargan/Hansen  is  the  test  of  the  over-identifying
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2, under the null of instruments’ validity. ***:p≤0.01, **: p≤0.05, *:p≤0.10.  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables ROA             ROE             NIM             ROA             ROE             NIM
(1)                   (2)                    (3)                   (4)                   (5)                   (6) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profitability (-1) 0.584*** 0.549*** 0.597*** 0.553*** 0.536*** 0.573***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Independent directors 0.216** 0.205** 0.230** 0.211** 0.199** 0.228**
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
Financial and banking professors 0.274*** 0.252*** 0.289*** 0.261*** 0.250*** 0.283***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
ve49
Professional qualified accountants 0.083 0.062 0.085 0.064 0.049 0.068
[0.14] [0.18] [0.14] [0.19] [0.24] [0.18]
Financial experts from other industries 0.196** 0.178** 0.219*** 0.184** 0.162** 0.201***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01]
Industry concentration 0.102* 0.085* 0.119*
[0.09] [0.10] [0.08]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                   (2)                   (3)                   (4)                    (5)                   (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Operating expenses management 0.125** 0.107* 0.138**
[0.05] [0.07] [0.04]
Credit risk 0.055** 0.047* 0.064**
[0.05] [0.06] [0.04]
Total assets -0.714*** -0.686*** -0.731***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Equity capital ratio 0.289*** 0.267*** 0.305***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ve50
Liquidity ratio -0.185*** -0.169** -0.204***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.00]
Chair/CEO position 0.055* 0.032 0.067**
[0.07] [0.16] [0.05]
Board size -0.009 -0.004 -0.013
[0.23] [0.29] [0.21]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                  (2)                    (3)                   (4)                    (5)                   (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Audit Committee 0.029* 0.025* 0.034*
[0.09] [0.10] [0.08]
Gender 0.038** 0.032* 0.047**
[0.05] [0.06] [0.04]
Financial expertise x financial and banking
professors 0.069** 0.061** 0.082***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
Financial expertise x professional qualified
ve51
accountants 0.018 0.013 0.023
[0.35] [0.39] [0.32]
Financial expertise x financial experts from
other industries 0.058** 0.052** 0.071***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.01]
Variables ROA ROE NIM ROA ROE NIM
(1)                  (2)                    (3)                   (4)                   (5)                    (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Constant 1.028** 1.074** 1.033** 0.811* 0.773* 0.803*
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.07] [0.08] [0.07]
Diagnostics
R-squared adjusted 0.52 0.47 0.55 0.83 0.79 0.88
No. of instruments 12 14 14 29 26 28
AR(2) [0.34] [0.37] [0.39] [0.49] [0.45] [0.56]
Sargan/Hansen test [0.52] [0.51] [0.60] [0.63] [0.59] [0.66]
Number of observations 64 64 64 64 64 64
ve52
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 8. GMM Results: Board of Directors Financial Expertise and Bank Profitability-the Big Four Banks.
This table reports General Method of Moments (GMM) fixed effects coefficients from predicting bank profitability proxied by three alternative
definitions, i.e. return on assets, return on equity and net interest margins. The estimates include only 4 banks, the so called big four banks, i.e.
HSBC, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Lloyds Banking Group. Statistics are based on annual data, spanning the period 2001- 2016. The
estimates are in relevance to six alternative model specifications. The first three columns present the bivariate (without the control) variables
across the three definitions of profitability, while the remaining three columns report the full model (including the control variables) across the
same three definitions of profitability.  Figures in brackets  denote p-values.  AR2 is  the test  for second-order serial  correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Sargan/Hansen is the test of the
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2, under the null of instruments’ validity. ***:p≤0.01, **: p≤0.05, *:p≤0.10.  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables ROA             ROE            NIM            ROA            ROE            NIM
(1)                   (2)                  (3)                    (4)                   (5)                    (6) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profitability (-1) 0.687*** 0.661*** 0.715*** 0.642*** 0.626*** 0.679***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Financial expertise 0.418*** 0.403*** 0.473*** 0.401*** 0.384*** 0.439***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Independent directors 0.201** 0.187** 0.214** 0.192** 0.177** 0.184**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
ve53
Industry concentration 0.137* 0.102* 0.141*
[0.06] [0.07] [0.06]
Operating expenses management 0.182** 0.138** 0.196**
[0.02] [0.05] [0.02]
Credit risk 0.107** 0.092** 0.129**
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02]
Variables ROA           ROE          NIM             ROA             ROE             NIM
(1)                (2)                   (3)                       (4)                    (5)                   (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total assets -0.816*** -0.796*** -0.837***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Equity capital ratio 0.331*** 0.305*** 0.359***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Liquidity ratio -0.228*** -0.196** -0.247***
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Chair/CEO position 0.064* 0.040* 0.077**
[0.06] [0.09] [0.03]
ve54
Board size -0.023 -0.011 -0.035
[0.18] [0.22] [0.14]
Audit Committee 0.042* 0.030* 0.049**
[0.06] [0.10] [0.05]
Gender 0.046** 0.039** 0.054**
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03]
Variables ROA              ROE             NIM             ROA             ROE            NIM
(1)                   (2)                   (3)                    (4)                   (5)                   (6)   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Financial expertise x board size -0.032** -0.028** -0.041**
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02]
Financial expertise x independent directors 0.039** 0.031** 0.048***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.01]
Constant 1.074** 1.042** 1.109** 0.813* 0.785* 0.829*
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.07] [0.06] [0.07]
Diagnostics
R-squared adjusted 0.47 0.42 0.52 0.85 0.80 0.87
ve55
No. of instruments 11 12 14 25 26 27
AR(2) [0.36] [0.32] [0.39] [0.46] [0.38] [0.46]
Sargan/Hansen test [0.55] [0.52] [0.60] [0.55] [0.53] [0.64]
Number of observations 592 592 592 592 592 592
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 9. GMM Results:  Board of  Directors  Financial  Expertise  and Credit
Risk-The Four Large Banks.
This  table  reports  General  Method of  Moments  (GMM) fixed  effects  coefficients
from predicting the credit risk of banks. The estimates include only 4 banks, the so
called  big  four  banks,  i.e.  HSBC,  Barclays,  Royal  Bank of  Scotland,  and Lloyds
Banking Group. Statistics are based on annual data, spanning the period 2001- 2016.
The  estimates  are  in  relevance  to  two  alternative  model  specifications.  The  first
column presents the bivariate (without the control) variables, while the second column
reports the full model (including the control variables). Figures in brackets denote p-
values.  AR2 is  the  test  for  second-order  serial  correlation  in  the  first-differenced
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation.  Sargan/Hansen  is  the  test  of  the  over-identifying  restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as χ2, under the null of instruments’ validity. ***:p≤0.01,
**: p≤0.05.  
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables  (1)    (2) 
_____________________________________________________________________
Financial expertise 0.204*** 0.185***
[0.00] [0.00]


















R-squared adjusted 0.48 0.86
No. of instruments 11 26
AR(2) [0.39] [0.60]
Sargan/Hansen test [0.53] [0.59]
Number of observations 656 656
_____________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 10. GMM Results: Board of Directors Financial Expertise and Bank Profitability-Types of Banks and ROA.
This table reports General Method of Moments (GMM) fixed effects coefficients from predicting bank profitability proxied as return on assets.
The estimates include all 41 banks. The estimates are in relevance to the type of bank included in the analysis. In particular, the sample includes
commercial banks, mortgage banks, investment banks, and others (general financial services, financial services to charities, trade unions, special
business and other organizations). In cases where a bank was involved in more than one type of activities, the classification was based on the
major proportion the bank’s loan activities focuses on, e.g. commercial/retailing, investment, financial services, mortgage, and other. Statistics
are based on annual data, spanning the period 2001- 2016. The estimates are in relevance to six alternative model specifications. The first three
columns present the bivariate (without the control) variables across the three definitions of profitability, while the remaining three columns
report the full model (including the control variables) across the same three definitions of profitability. Figures in brackets denote p-values. AR2
is the test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of
no serial correlation. Sargan/Hansen is the test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2, under the null of instruments’
validity. ***:p≤0.01, **: p≤0.05, *:p≤0.10.  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables         Commercial       Mortgage       Investment Other
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profitability (-1) 0.714*** 0.618*** 0.674*** 0.562***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Financial expertise 0.476*** -0.294*** 0.585*** 226***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Independent directors 0.203** -0.142** 0.264** 0.177**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05]
Industry concentration 0.078* 0.096* 0.168** 0.082*
ve59
[0.10] [0.08] [0.04] [0.09]
Operating expenses management 0.169** 0.124* 0.197*** 0.106*
[0.03] [0.07] [0.01] [0.09]
Credit risk 0.044** 0.078** 0.116*** 0.049**
[0.05] [0.03] [0.01] [0.05]
Variables         Commercial       Mortgage       Investment Other
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total assets -0.694*** -0.708*** -0.796*** -0.662***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Equity capital ratio 0.284*** 0.299*** 0.346*** 0.275***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Liquidity ratio -0.174** -0.199** -0.244*** -0.168**
[0.03] [0.02] [0.00] [0.03]
Chair/CEO position 0.073** 0.082** 0.038 0.035
[0.05] [0.04] [0.18] [0.20]
Board size -0.009 -0.003 -0.029 -0.006
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[0.22] [0.27] [0.12] [0.24]
Audit Committee 0.028* 0.021* 0.059** 0.019*
[0.09] [0.10] [0.05] [0.10]
Gender 0.049** 0.038* 0.029* 0.025*
[0.04] [0.06] [0.08] [0.10]
Variables         Commercial       Mortgage       Investment Other
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Financial expertise x board size -0.024** -0.020** -0.052*** -0.019*
[0.04] [0.05] [0.00] [0.06]
Financial expertise x independent directors 0.030** 0.024* 0.063*** 0.026*
[0.04] [0.06] [0.00] [0.06]
Constant 0.811* 0.826* 0.764* 0.944**
[0.09] [0.08] [0.10] [0.04]
Diagnostics
R-squared adjusted 0.81 0.77 0.85 0.69
No. of instruments 28 25 26 27
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AR(2) [0.51] [0.35] [0.59] [0.48]
Sargan/Hansen test [0.54] [0.50] [0.74] [0.51]
Number of observations 400 64 128 64
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
ve62
FIGURE 1. Descriptive Statistics.
The  figure  illustrates  statistical  information  on  the  primary  variables  under
consideration: the percentage of financial expertise across independent directors (1),
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